Frases de nuestro ingenioso gran maestro, maese Francisco Javier López-Balda, y otras que merecen ser contadas (recopiladas por Lucas Delclaux a lo largo de 2007, 2008 y 2009)- ‘Este nombre no es el resultado de una noche de locura’- ‘Los poetas tienen licencia para matar’- ‘Esto es de perogrullo’- ‘vamos a dar la vuelta al calcetín’- ‘Es un impacto lingüístico’- ‘Esto no es la república de IKEA’- ‘¿No sois los BI’s boys?’- ‘Es de verbo caliente’- ‘Desmenuzando’- ‘Sacar todo el jugo’- ‘Es lo que yo llamo examen frontera’- ‘La Real Academia de la Lengua es como la Santa Madre Iglesia’- ‘Picoteando’- ‘Es una empanadilla sin rellenar’- ‘Empíricamente’- ‘Os voy a dar un potosí’- ‘Aquí tenemos una noticia arqueológica’- ‘Como paño en oro’- ‘No lo dejeis a medias tintas’- ‘Ve al grano’- ‘Llovieron chuzos de punta’- ‘Ley de Economía Lingüística’- ‘Para una muestra sólo hace falta un botón’- ‘Esto no lo hago para pasar el rato’- ‘Esto no lo hago por turismo lingüístico’- ‘No me mareeis con la casuística’- ‘Esto parece un mercado de verduras’- ‘Guarrear (o ensuciar) el texto’- ‘¡Que esto parece un parto!’- ‘La Lengua es mágica’- ‘Esto es de libro’- ‘Esto sólo funciona para el cómputo silábico’- ‘No te tires de la moto que no llevas casco’- ‘Atención, pregunta de estas de Trivial’- ‘Pareceis el club de fans de Bustamante’- ‘Os voy a dar un truquito de mercadillo, de estos baratos, baratos’- ‘El paralelismo es una figura que yo llamo figura cereza’- ‘Vamos a comentar el texto en directo’- ‘Os voy a dar un truquito de estos de andar por casa’- ‘Esto a lo mejor en los Simpson, pero aquí no’- ‘Teneis que ir rápidamente a la ITV a cambiar amortiguadores’- ‘No podeis venir al examen sin conocer a la novia’- ‘El verbo que más me gusta es SATISFACER’- ‘Eso será en tu barrio’- ‘Esto es coser y cantar’- ‘Castellano puro y castizo de Valladolid’- ‘La Filosofía no tiene nunca respuestas’- ‘Eres un..........leísta’- ‘La pasiva es una extraña’- ‘Eso es metafísicamente imposible’- ‘Esta proposición subordinada me chirría’- ‘Esto es sólo un aperitivo’- ‘Nos vamos metiendo en el país de la oración’- ‘Una especie de Sudoku conceptual’- ‘Es que esto parece el rito del cortejo’- ‘Esto es arquitectura poética’- ‘¡Alonso estáte quieto!’- ‘Aviso ante notario’- ‘Atención, que aquí está la madre del cordero’- ‘Porque hay chinos, indios, pero son cientos y la madre’- ‘¡Ah, yo que sé!, ¡Yo no soy Rappel!- ‘El Neoclasicismo es un movimiento castrador’- ‘No vamos a ser esclavos de la selectividad’- ‘Hay figuras retóricas hasta en una receta de cocina’- ‘Eres un mendigo de la Lengua’- ‘Te recuerdo que tú rezas con la palabra’- ‘Pareceís verduleras, tíos’- ‘¿Por qué te ríes así? Pareces un juguete de Navidad’ (a Nacho Vidri tras reírse)- ‘Que si quereis podemos jugar al veo-veo’- ‘¡Oye, esto parece una subasta!- ‘El que vaya a subir nota, que vaya a subir nota, no de picnic ni a tomar el té’- ‘Esto parece una subasta de fondos del Estado’- ‘Normalmente no se venden muchos libros de poesía: cuatro para los amigos y dos de despistados’- ‘Pareceis verduleras menopáusicas’- ‘Aquí encontramos un icono erótico-festivo: Marilyn Monroe’- ‘Es como si el Ibex perdiera 1000 puntos’- ‘Ahora estamos en la fase patera’- ‘Esto parece un mercadilla persa’- ‘Como sigais así vais a engrosar las listas de paro de este país’- ‘Hay que abrirse al mundo de la Lengua’- ‘Los intelectuales deben criticar al poder, gobierne quien gobierne’- ‘Espero que a nadie se le haya ocurrido que eso es un Complemento Directo, eso es un pensamiento impuro’- ‘El Manzanares es una meadilla de río’
sábado, 12 de junio de 2010
El Gran Maestro
lunes, 17 de mayo de 2010
Prepare to get schooled in my austrian perspective!
lunes, 3 de mayo de 2010
No vale la pena leer esto.
"Estoy Cansado"Charles Dickens
martes, 27 de abril de 2010
¿Biblioteca o pasarela?
¿Que arde un convento?, yo me lavo las manos, ¿que matan a alguien a tiros?, yo me lavo las manos, ¿que aquí no trabaja ni Dios y que las huelgas se suceden unas a otras?, yo me lavo las manos, ¿que los militares se sublevan?, yo me lavo las manos, ¿que los mineros asturianos declaran la huelga general revolucionaria?, yo me lavo las manos ¡joder qué país más limpio! Ya le digo, así da gusto.
Camilo José Cela
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lunes, 12 de abril de 2010
¡Concentración!


domingo, 21 de marzo de 2010
64
Mi intención es estudiar Economía y Política (LL12), pero leyendo tu blog no sé si me he metido en un berenjenal de mucho cuidado.
Andrés Horcajo
¡Hoy, oficialmente primer día de primavera el sol ha decidido visitar Londres! Se estaba genial bebiendo Iced Tea al lado del canal, o dando un paseo en bicicleta por el parque... pero hay examen, y a la biblioteca fui de cabeza. Examen el lunes, avisado el viernes. Examen de un libro completo de 300 páginas. En fin, después del desastre del otro examen de macroeconomía, habrá que enseñarle a este señor lo bien que sabemos hacer los exámenes los españoles. Hay otro examen el martes de micro, que todavía no me he empezado a preparar (tocará empezar una vez acabado el examen de macro, mañana a las 4 de la tarde, y seguramente habrá que aguantar un all-nighter, hola Redbull sin azúcar) y después, lo que queda de semana es relajado y feliz hasta que coja el vuelo a Madrid el viernes. ¡Ya puedo oler el incienso y el azahar! Aunque como aquí no se celebra la Semana Santa (las vacaciones son de pascua, tres semanas) me voy a saltar la última semana de curso, pero no pasa nada, son todo sesiones de repaso que no me an a beneficiar mucho de todas maneras. Mañana me toca recoger el calendario de exámenes, ¡esperemos que pueda estar libre antes de Junio! Como no me echan de la casa hasta Julio, pues aprovecharé para sacar el carné de conducir.
Do John Rawls’ two principles of justice succeed in uniting the principle of liberty with the ideal of equality?
ABSTRACT
John Rawls proposes two principles of justice in his book “A theory of Justice”: justice should be based in access to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties and inequalities should be to everyone’s advantage. Through this principles he creates a web in which justice is completely supported by equality and liberty, in a situation in which one cannot exist without the other two. The implication of equality in justice is proved with the assertion that justice can only be applied to equal beings. The implication of liberty, through a society of equal beings in which therefore liberty is the obedience to general will. Once proved both implications examples are provided: through equality of opportunity and obedience to the general will Rawls’ success is proved. After a brief analysis of the criticisms, the conclusion is that, even if a presence of the natural right in his work is desirable he succeeds in uniting the three concepts.
Uniting the ideal of equality with the principle of liberty through two principles of justice is one of the many ideas that John Rawls attempted in his book “A theory of justice”, first published in 1971. However, the question itself implies many other questions that can arise before the study begins. What do we mean by ideal of equality and principle of liberty? Does justice comprise liberty and equality? Does the ideal of equality imply the non-existence of inequalities? Does liberty limit equality? Or vice versa? Does justice limit them both? But most important of all, how does justice unite liberty and equality? And do Rawls’ principles achieve this? The aim of this essay is to provide rational answers to these questions and analyse the union of liberty and equality that can emerge from Rawls’ two principles.
Justice has had different meanings through the history of political thought. From Aristotle’s definition “refraining from pleonexia”[1] (In the sense that a situation is just as long as an individual does not gain advantage for himself by taking hold of another individual’s properties) through the utilitarianism of Bentham, one of the latest theories of justice is that of John Rawls. In the book mentioned above, “A theory of Justice”, Rawls states that the principles of justice should be determined by “the choice which rational men would make in the hypothetical situation of equal liberty”[2], that is, the rules that men (and women) would agree to base their society on, if they were absolutely identical, or, as Rawls defines it, under “a veil of ignorance” that would prevent them to know their social position in society, their own abilities and capacities, sex or race.
In the Rawlsian jargon, the previous situation is known as the “original position”. From this original position is where the rational men and women stated above will agree in the principles of justice. Rawls calls his theory “justice as fairness”, since “it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair” (the original position).[3] The two principles are as follows:[4]
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are: A) Reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and B) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
If these two principles are to set the basis of justice, it can be agreed that injustice occurs whenever they are not observed. Society or individuals, then, are unjust when they restrict other’s liberties or opportunities, or when they allow the existence of inequalities that are not to the advantage of every person. To prevent injustice, Rawls states that justice should be taken as “a complex of three ideas: liberty, equality and reward for services contributing to the common good.”[5]
Barbara Goodwin defines equality as “the first assumption of morality”[6], that is, that morality needs to be based in equality, since individuals do not need or tend to act morally with others considered inferior. Only those considered as equal or superior will deserve a moral treatment. When relating it to justice, different types of equality come to mind: equality before the law, political equality (all men are equal to women, black are equal to white, etc with respect to access to office, suffrage…), and the most important of all, equality of opportunity. The latter is even implied directly in principle II-b, and it will be developed later on.
It is clear that equality is a fundamental part of justice, since without humans being equal there could be no sense of just society in the sense that Rousseau described (and that Rawls shares): “private concerns become considerably fewer, because each individual shares so largely in the common happiness that he has no occasion to seek for it in private resources.”[7] In this just society, individuals are so equal that the public affaires are what becomes important. From here it can be concluded that the ideal of equality comprises a society in which all individuals are equal politically and before the law, and have all equal access to opportunities. Living in this ideal of equality provides the background for a competitive justice to operate.
The second idea that conforms justice is liberty (or freedom). Since the seventeenth century, political thought and philosophy agree that only free men can have access to justice. This is supported by the idea of equality, since non-free persons are, in a sense, inferior to those who are, and therefore they should not have access to a justice designed to be used by equal individuals. These theories have evolved and now state that, all men are equal then all have the right to be free; in fact, as a matter of justice, it is an injustice to cut anyone’s liberty. However, there are different ways to understand liberty. In its extreme sense (“I do what I want, how and when I want to”) liberty itself can be unjust, because it can strike other’s liberties or rights (for example, if an individual chooses not to pay taxes he is abusing of the other taxpayers, etc). This is the kind of liberty that Rawls is referring to when he speaks about “the most extensive scheme of basic liberties”: the most extensive scheme, which can be restricted by law, society or moral. However, there are other ways to understand liberty, the most important of them the one that Rousseau proposes: liberty as obedience to the general will. This conception of liberty is perfectly compatible to the conception of equality seen above, in which individuals are absolutely equal.
However there is an important difference (that Rawls remarks) between the sense of equality as a social ideal, that is, a society in which all have the same rights, privileges and duties independent of their age, position, race, etcetera, and the sense of equality as a concept of justice. It has been said above that equality is a requirement for justice, but it is clear that an equal treatment is not sufficient for justice to exist. Liberty has a priority role in the Theory of Justice: it is unjust not to have access to the basic liberties. In fact, Rawls summarizes the importance of both when he claims that “justice requires only an equal liberty.”[8] Liberty is then restricted by equality; only what economists call “Pareto efficiency” is allowed: liberty can be exercised in order to make an individual better off, if and only if that exercise does not make any other individual worse off. The equality of liberty, therefore, limits positive liberty but enhances in exchange the negative, since (all individuals having equal liberties) interference between them is not necessary. From here it can be concluded that the existence of inequality implies injustice, and vice versa. As said before, equality and liberty in the sense of justice hold hands, so it can be also concluded that an injustice entails as well a lack of liberty.
Principle II-b defines the most important role of equality in the Rawlsian conception of justice: justice as fair equality of opportunity. From the individuals in a society, “those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances.”[9] Equality of opportunity is one of the ways through which the union of justice with liberty and equality can be proved. Fair equality of opportunity implies liberty of choice: for example, in a society in which “positions and offices are open to all”[10], as the second principle states, the individuals have the liberty to choose to which position or office are they going to apply for, if they apply for any. In a broader sense, in the second principle, Rawls is explaining how the inequalities should be distributed. That means that there is the assumption that inequalities are always going to exist, therefore the ideal of equality as the non-existence of inequalities is reformulated by Rawls. Inequalities are always going to exist in a society; as a result, in order for justice to exist, inequalities have to be distributed to everyone’s advantage. The only way in which these inequalities can be allocated in a just way is the one in which they are accepted freely. In the moment an individual is forced to suffer an inequality, an injustice is being perpetrated. That is one example of the ways in which Rawls’ two principles succeed in uniting liberty with equality.
It has been said above that a possible interpretation of liberty is the one Rousseau proposes: liberty as obedience to the general will. That definition is also linked with equality, since only all individuals being equal can they interest themselves more in the public issues than in the private ones. To achieve this concept of liberty, Goodwin clarifies, individuals should “divest themselves of their selfish interests.”[11] Rawls also treats the theme of selfishness in his work, but he calls it envy: “the special assumption I make is that a rational individual does not suffer from envy…”[12]. What can be deduced from the absence of selfishness/envy in both works is that selfishness provokes inequality, i.e. makes us unequal. An easier way to explain this is that if equality is the first asset of morality (as seen above), and selfishness is not moral, selfishness makes us unequal. By eliminating selfishness, the principle of liberty is to obey the general will. The general will can only be obeyed if all individuals are equal, therefore this is another example of the success of the two principles.
Whereas Rawls’s treatment of concepts such as primary goods, status quo and other has been widely criticised in the academic ambit, it is not those in which the essay is based. There have been critics, however, to the enforcement of positive rights (the right to be exposed to an action of other individual) that he applies to various things such as equality of opportunity. Robert Nozick claims that "These 'rights' require a substructure of things and materials and actions (…) and other people may have rights and entitlements over these.”[13] It is precisely this substructure failure what has been lambasted widely. As seen, Nozick and many authors claim that Rawls’ theory is based on erroneous principles, and therefore the principles are flawed and cannot unite any ideals of equality with principles of liberty. Philosopher Allan Bloom denounces the non-existence of the natural right in any point of Rawls’ theory: “disappointingly, A theory of Justice does not even manifest an awareness of this need, let alone respond to it.”[14] Without the basis of natural right and positive rights, they argue, the theory is built over weak pillars. A final criticism is that of Amdur concerning liberty. He states that “Still, Rawls does not want to argue that (…) liberties are absolute”[15], but that “his limits (to liberties) are (…) insignificant”[16], therefore exposing the weakness of Rawls’ argumentation.
Be that as it may, the responses to Rawls’ Theory of Justice focus mainly, as said above, in topics other than the union of the ideal of equality with the principle of liberty through his two principles of justice. In conclusion, the criticism arisen from this work is not strong enough to overshadow Rawls’ reasoning. Even though a presence of Natural right in his work would be desirable, without it, it is perfectly possible to reach the conclusion that he is successful in joining the two concepts through the principle of justice by establishing a web in which liberty, and equality support justice, and any of the elements can exist if one of them is missing, as it has been proved in the examples above.
Bibliography:
Amdur, R. (1977) “Rawls’ theory of justice: domestic and international perspective” published in “World Politics”, Volume 29, Nr. 3
Bloom, A. (1975) “Justice: John Rawls vs. the tradition of political philosophy”, published in The American political Science review, vol. 69, nr 2 Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1959094?seq=1&Search=yes&term=bloom&term=allan&term=rawls&term=right&term=natural&list=hide&searchUri=/action/doBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dallan%2Bbloom%2Brawls%2Bnatural%2Bright%26gw%3Djtx%26prq%3Dallan%2Bbloom%2Brawls%26Search%3DSearch%26hp%3D25%26wc%3Don&item=4&ttl=153&returnArticleService=showArticle&resultsServiceName=doBasicResultsFromArticle. Last accessed 5/3/10, 00.32
Goodwin, B. (2007) “Using political ideas”. Chichester: Wiley
Nozick, R. (1974) “Anarchy, state and utopia”. London: Blackwell
Rawls, J. (1971) “A theory of justice”. Oxford: Oxford university press.
Rawls, J. (1964) “Justice as fairness” in Laslett, P. and Runciman, W. “Philosophy, politics and society”. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Rousseau, J. (1762) “The social contract”. Book III
Tawney, R. (1931) “Equality”. London: Unwin Brothers
Wolff, R. (1977) “Understanding Rawls”. Guildford: Princeton University Press
[1] Rawls, J. (1971) “A theory of justice”. Oxford: Oxford university press. P. 9
[2] Rawls, J. (1971) Op. Cit. P.11
[3] Rawls, J. (1971) Op. Cit. P.11
[4] Rawls, J. (1971) Op. Cit. P.53 The “fair equality of opportunity” part is added on P. 72
[5] Rawls, J. (1964) “Justice as fairness” in Laslett, P. and Runciman, W. “Philosophy, politics and society”, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, P. 134 (Rawls himself states that these principles can be found on Mill’s “on liberty” and elsewhere).
[6] Goodwin, B. (2007) “Using political ideas”. Chichester: Wiley, P. 417
[7] Rousseau, J. (1762) “The social contract”, Book III, chapter XV
[8] Rawls, J. (1964) “Justice as fairness” in Laslett, P. and Runciman, W. “Philosophy, politics and society”, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, P. 134
[9] Rawls, J. (1971) “A theory of justice”. Oxford: Oxford university press. P. 63
[10] Rawls, J. (1971) Op. Cit. P. 72
[11] Goodwin, B. (2007) “Using political ideas”. Chichester: Wiley, P. 347
[12] Rawls, J. (1971) Op. Cit. P. 125
[13] Nozick, R. (1974) “Anarchy, state and utopia” London: Blackwell, P. 238
[14] Bloom, A. (1975) “Justice: John Rawls vs. the tradition of political philosophy”, published in The American political Science review, vol. 69, nr 2 P. 648. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1959094?seq=1&Search=yes&term=bloom&term=allan&term=rawls&term=right&term=natural&list=hide&searchUri=/action/doBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dallan%2Bbloom%2Brawls%2Bnatural%2Bright%26gw%3Djtx%26prq%3Dallan%2Bbloom%2Brawls%26Search%3DSearch%26hp%3D25%26wc%3Don&item=4&ttl=153&returnArticleService=showArticle&resultsServiceName=doBasicResultsFromArticle. Last accessed 5/3/10, 00.32
[15] Amdur, R. (1977) “Rawls’ theory of justice: domestic and international perspective” published in “World Politics”, Volume 29, Nr. 3 P. 440
[16] Amdur, R. (1977) Op. Cit. P. 441
miércoles, 10 de marzo de 2010
La venida
Y el hombre, en su orgullo, creó a Dios a su imagen y semejanzaFriedrich Nietzsche
viernes, 5 de marzo de 2010
Mi reino por una tostada
Se trata de los principios que personas racionales y libres interesadas en promover su propio interés aceptarían en una poscición original de igualdad de modo que defina los fundamentos de los términos de su asociación:Primero: cada persona debe tener un derecho igual al esquema más extenso de libertades básicas iguales compatible con un esquema similar de libertades para otros.Segundo: Las desigualdades sociales y económicas deben de resolverse de modo tal que:a) resulten en el mayor beneficio de los miembros menos aventajados de la sociedadb) los cargos y puestos deben de estar abiertos para todos bajo condiciones de igualdad de oportunidadesJohn Rawls
lunes, 1 de marzo de 2010
Ante la ley
| Ante la ley hay un guardián. Un campesino se presenta frente a este guardián, y solicita que le permita entrar en la Ley. Pero el guardián contesta que por ahora no puede dejarlo entrar. El hombre reflexiona y pregunta si más tarde lo dejarán entrar. -Tal vez -dice el centinela- pero no por ahora. La puerta que da a la Ley está abierta, como de costumbre; cuando el guardián se hace a un lado, el hombre se inclina para espiar. El guardián lo ve, se sonríe y le dice: -Si tu deseo es tan grande haz la prueba de entrar a pesar de mi prohibición. Pero recuerda que soy poderoso. Y sólo soy el último de los guardianes. Entre salón y salón también hay guardianes, cada uno más poderoso que el otro. Ya el tercer guardián es tan terrible que no puedo mirarlo siquiera. El campesino no había previsto estas dificultades; la Ley debería ser siempre accesible para todos, piensa, pero al fijarse en el guardián, con su abrigo de pieles, su nariz grande y aguileña, su barba negra de tártaro, rala y negra, decide que le conviene más esperar. El guardián le da un escabel y le permite sentarse a un costado de la puerta. Allí espera días y años. Intenta infinitas veces entrar y fatiga al guardián con sus súplicas. Con frecuencia el guardián conversa brevemente con él, le hace preguntas sobre su país y sobre muchas otras cosas; pero son preguntas indiferentes, como las de los grandes señores, y, finalmente siempre le repite que no puede dejarlo entrar. El hombre, que se ha provisto de muchas cosas para el viaje, sacrifica todo, por valioso que sea, para sobornar al guardián. Este acepta todo, en efecto, pero le dice: -Lo acepto para que no creas que has omitido ningún esfuerzo. Durante esos largos años, el hombre observa casi continuamente al guardián: se olvida de los otros y le parece que éste es el único obstáculo que lo separa de la Ley. Maldice su mala suerte, durante los primeros años audazmente y en voz alta; más tarde, a medida que envejece, sólo murmura para sí. Retorna a la infancia, y como en su cuidadosa y larga contemplación del guardián ha llegado a conocer hasta las pulgas de su cuello de piel, también suplica a las pulgas que lo ayuden y convenzan al guardián. Finalmente, su vista se debilita, y ya no sabe si realmente hay menos luz, o si sólo lo engañan sus ojos. Pero en medio de la oscuridad distingue un resplandor, que surge inextinguible de la puerta de la Ley. Ya le queda poco tiempo de vida. Antes de morir, todas las experiencias de esos largos años se confunden en su mente en una sola pregunta, que hasta ahora no ha formulado. Hace señas al guardián para que se acerque, ya que el rigor de la muerte comienza a endurecer su cuerpo. El guardián se ve obligado a agacharse mucho para hablar con él, porque la disparidad de estaturas entre ambos ha aumentado bastante con el tiempo, para desmedro del campesino. -¿Qué quieres saber ahora? -pregunta el guardián-. Eres insaciable. -Todos se esfuerzan por llegar a la Ley -dice el hombre-; ¿cómo es posible entonces que durante tantos años nadie más que yo pretendiera entrar? El guardián comprende que el hombre está por morir, y para que sus desfallecientes sentidos perciban sus palabras, le dice junto al oído con voz atronadora: -Nadie podía pretenderlo porque esta entrada era solamente para ti. Ahora voy a cerrarla. Franz Kafka |
viernes, 5 de febrero de 2010
De Stravinsky y la Nueva Derecha
IS THE NEW RIGHT A LIBERAL OR CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT?
Bosco F. Alava, Queen Mary, University of London
ABSTRACT
The New right is a movement which arose in the sixties, that bases its thinking around the importance of the man as an individual, and thus favours the existence of a free, laisez-faire market and the respect for individual liberties. Neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism have in common that they arose as a response to the damages the free market did in the economy, with individualism as base. In spite of their common points, the irreconciliation if their philosophical roots renders them incompatible. The New right resembles neo-liberalism in its conception of the human being and the economic theory of free market. By contrast, resembles neo- conservatism in the sense that it has a strong “looking back to a golden age” tendency. However, looking back to a primary conservatism in which the welfare state still has not been adopted, or to a neo-conservatism that rejects it, the two ideologies have many common points. However, different factors will lead to the conclusion that New Right belongs to a neo-liberal approach.
This essay will try to give a comparative approach to the “New Right”, and try to classify it as a conservative or liberal movement. Firstly, an introduction to the New Right will be given, followed by a summary of the views of both liberal and conservative groups. An analysis of the neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism, of their similarities and differences and compatibility will follow. Then a detailed analysis of the similarities and differences of the New Right with this schools of thought in both social end economic matters will lead to an answer to the question this essay has for title.
The New Right is a set of ideas that arose in the sixties, and have had influence in the last three decades of political thought. It is said to be “strongly economistic”[1], in the sense that its main lines of consideration are based on the idea of free economic choice rather than the welfare state (as it motivates individuals to depend on benefits), and it favours free market. As with respect to social policy, it is based on (or according to Barry, is a response to)[2] the post-war consensus, and postulates the belief that “the individual human is primary”[3] and thus, the individual should matter over the moral standards. It also believes in voluntary cooperation as more effective than forced and it is hostile to racial, religious and sexual prejudice as well as privilege. Finally, its thought is depicted with the ideas of rationalism and optimism. However, to classify the New right into one of the two most broadly spread political doctrines (liberalism and conservatism), a short analysis of both will be provided.
Liberalism can be shortly defined as “a political orientation that favours social progress by reform and by changing laws rather than by revolution”, and also as “an economic theory advocating free competition and self-regulating market”. [4] Barbara Goodwin defines the main “ingredients of liberalism” as: a conception of the individual being “essentially rational”[5], a government “based on the
Consent of people”[6] with law and a constitution that limit its power, in a society marked by freedom, equality of opportunity and social justice based on merit.
However, this doctrine has evolved to what in this essay will be called “neo-liberalism”, even though this term refers to the classical economic liberalism developed from 1938 by economists and sociologists such as Rüstow. Barbara Goodwin identifies some contemporary principles that are born from liberalism, but “which also challenge it in certain ways”.[7] The most extreme of these is libertarianism, which can be understood as a pure and radical liberalism. Libertarians believe in absolute freedom of thought and speech and the use of state to create greater equality, but at the same time eliminate all the state intervention in economy or other public affairs. Other elements of the new liberalism are nationalism (seen as a reaction against imperialist oppressive regimes) and a renewed “mainstream” liberalism that continues with the traditional approach but with little changes, for example the substitution of the “self-interested individual” for the “self-interested group”. One of the maximum exponents of this set of ideas, Thatcher, is clear about this trend: “There is no such thing as society (…) only individuals and families”[8]
Conservatism, in the other hand is defined as the “political orientation advocating the preservation of the best in society and opposing radical changes”[9]. This political theory is completely opposed to liberalism in the sense that its “view of human nature is an acceptance of the need for (…) authoritarian government”.[10] Again as opposed to liberalism, in economics matter conservatives prefer government intervention on economics affairs.
As well as liberalism, the conservative doctrine has suffered an evolution, which has transformed the actual conservatism in something in many ways different than the ideas that the founders had in mind. The initial conservatism, which favoured the virtues of tradition, and was, over all, mostly an economic doctrine, had been slowly modified to adopt the Welfare state as one of its predominant ideas. Neo-conservatism was a response to this “welfare liberalism”, as Goodwin calls it, that had appeared after World War two. Neoconservative thinkers reject the idea of welfare state and try to return to this “pure” conservatism, by praising the initial liberal individualist approach. Even though conservatism has always been associated with the right in the political spectrum, the term “New Right” does not mean that the movement has to be compulsorily a neoconservative movement.
Even though traditionally, liberalism and conservatism have represented two absolutely different concepts and way of life (tradition vs. reform, free will vs. determinism, welfare state vs. economic liberalism, etc), in their new versions, the thinkers in both sides coincide in much more things than the original founders could have thought. Locke’s primitive individualism seems to be a base for the two, and also both abhor the state intervention. It seems that their origins are similar; both are born as a reaction to the political imbalances after World War two, but most importantly, their purpose is the same. They both arose as a criticism to their origins, driven by “the notion that liberalism and conservatism had failed”[11], and the two of them want to achieve the perfection that their original basis advocated for. At rough draft, it can also be said that both movements have a trend towards equalitarianism and away from authoritarianism.
Nevertheless, the fact that they have so many points in common does not mean that these two movements are the same. The broad differences between them are that the neoconservatives, if not totally preserving traditions, still look back and allow such traditions to influence their new decisions, while the neo-liberals are focused solely on radical change. Also, while the neoconservative movement has a strong preference for law and order, some authors classify some groups inside the neo-liberals as close to anarchism (for example the minarchists).
In spite of their similarities and differences, the fact that both movements exist at the same time means that they have to be either complimentary or contradictory. They both are, as said above, a response to the new generations of free market economic thinking applied since World War Two and the economic instability era that succeeded. In the sense that their aims and objectives are the same, the both movements are complimentary. Nevertheless, when analysed in depth come to light all the differences stated above, that happen because the two movements have very contrastive philosophical genesis. Concepts that seemed communal to both movements in the beginning, such as individualism, are unfolded to the rationalist neo-liberal perspective, contrary to the mistrust of human nature that underlies in the neoconservative theory. Their opposite philosophical roots make this two movements, if not contradictory, at least not complimentary, meaning that it is either one of both that it is going to be present in the new right, and therefore dominate the other, since the New Right is the most eminent doctrine regarding these two movements.
The New Right has many features that can make it belong to a neo-liberal movement. Coming back to the definition portrayed above, and as a movement based fundamentally in economics, it reflects exactly the economic liberal theory: in favour of the choice of individuals on how to spend and earn their money (and deciding on the services they want to pay for). New right thinkers believe in a laissez-faire economy, where excessive interventionism (like in the welfare state) should be avoided. Therefore, free market and competition are the key to an efficient economic system. This reminds to first economic liberalism theories, such as Adam Smith’s, that had been exchanged for more interventionist approaches after the 1929 market crash.
Precisely, the fundaments of libertarianism apply very well to the ideas on which the New Right is based. Both New Right thinkers and libertarians advocate the maximization of individual liberty, and fight the intervention of the state. In fact, their principles are so common that some authors dare to say that “the birth of the New Right occurred when libertarians finally accepted the fact that they had been abandoned by the liberals, used and misled by other radicals and sold out by the conservatives”[12], implying that the New Right owes its origins to, and is based in libertarianism.
The New Right has also many elements in common with conservatism. Its lines of thought have a “pronounced tendency to look back at a supposed Golden age”.[13] This is almost the signature of a conservative, who is opposed to radical change in the belief that all the past was better. Also, New Right thinkers are opposed to the actual conservative economic policies, but as Levitas states,
“Exponents of both strands of the New Right claim, in fact, to be returning to their original nineteenth-century forms, prior to the contamination by the “socialist” ideas of the welfare state”[14]
When taking into account the similarities of New Right with conservatism what comes to mind is the conservatism in vogue today, and then it is obvious that (at least in economic terms, which are the most important when speaking about the New Right) it defends exactly the contrary as nineteenth-century “original” conservatives. Nevertheless, if the term “conservative” has its meaning changed to “early conservative” (i.e., the doctrines that can be seen in Burke’s and Lord Salisbury’s writings), the clash about the conception of the economy (welfare state vs. free economic choice) between actual conservatives and New Right thinkers can be eliminated. However, the social and moral implications of the new right would be “too liberal” for an early conservatism.
Not, however, for neoconservatives who, as stated above, advocate to a “return” to the pure ideals of liberalism, but also having evolved accordingly with the actual times. This evolution makes possible that the neoconservative theory, and neoconservatives themselves are able to cope perfectly with the social and moral implications of the New Right.
Opinions vary between authors at the time of defining the position of the New Right in the political spectrum. While Goodwin directly defines it as a “new ideological variant of conservatism”,[15] Davies states that it is “best defined as neo-liberal, or (…) libertarian”,[16] and so does Barry but Lyons writes that “The New Right reminded many of us that there was life in conservatism after all”.[17] Some, like Green even claim that “the use of the term (New Right) is misleading because the old left-right dichotomy is now defunct”[18].
In spite of that, it seems that the New Right has more elements of liberalism than of conservatism, and more of neo-liberalism than of neo-conservatism. Its strong economistic doctrine of free market and lack of state intervention, as well as the moral approach mattering the individual even over moral standards come from the idea of the natural goodness of human being, a human being that does not need or want an exhaustive or invasive control by the government, neither in markets nor in its personal life. This conception of the human being around which the rest of the thought is built tips the balance considerably in favour of liberalism, and therefore can be concluded that even though not in a complete sense (the tendency to look back to a “golden age” and the importance given to economic policies might remind to an early conservatism), the New Right can be classified as a neo-liberal, if not libertarian, movement.
Bibliography:
Barry, N. (1985) The New Right. London: Croom Helm.
Davies, S. (1985). The Spectre haunting the left. In: Hayek, F.A The New Right enlightenment. Kent: Economic and literary books.
Dionne, E.J. (1991). Why Americans Hate Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 55
Green, D. (1985). From socialism to the new liberalism. In: Hayek, F.A The New Right enlightenment. London: Economic and literary books.
Goodwin, B (2007). Using political ideas. 5th ed. London: Wiley.
Klatch, R. (1999). A generation divided London: University of California Press
Levitas, R. (1986). The political economy of freedom. In: Levitas, R The ideology of the New Right. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lyons, P (1996). New left, New right and the legacy of the sixties. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
[1] Davies, S. (1985). “The Spectre haunting the left”. In: Hayek, F.A The New Right enlightenment. Kent: Economic and literary books. P 23.
[2] See: Barry, N.(1985) The New Right. London: Croom Helm. Preface.
[3] Davies, S. (1985). Op. Cit. P. 21
[4] Cognitive Science Laboratory (Princeton University). Available: http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=liberalism. Last accessed 24/11/2009.
[5] Goodwin, B (2007). Using political ideas. 5th ed. London: Wiley. P 37.
[6] Goodwin, B (2007). Op. Cit. P 39
[7] Goodwin, B (2007). Op. Cit. P 59
[8] Interview published in “Woman’s own” on 31/10/87. Available in http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689. Last accessed 20/1/10.
[9] Cognitive Science Laboratory (Princeton University). Available:
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=conservatism. Last accessed 25/11/2009
[10] Goodwin, B (2007). Op. Cit. P 165
[11] Dionne, E.J. (1991). “Why Americans Hate Politics”. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 55
[12] Lehr, S. & Rosetto Jr. , L.. (10/1/1971). “The New Right credo- libertarianism”. The New York Times magazine. P. 23-24.
[13] Davies, S. (1985). Op. Cit. P. 24
[14] Levitas, R. (1986). “The political economy of freedom”. In: Levitas, R The ideology of the New Right. Cambridge: Polity Press. P 4.
[15] Goodwin, B (2007). Op. Cit. P 171
[16] Davies, S. (1985). Op. Cit. P. 21
[17] Lyons, P (1996). New left, New right and the legacy of the sixties. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. P 71.
[18] Green, D. (1985). “From socialism to the new liberalism”. In: Hayek, F.A The New Right enlightenment. London: Economic and literary books. P 14.
Ahí queda la cosa. Os contaré el miércoles cómo ha ido. Besos o abrazos según corresponda.